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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1957, Justice Hugo Black, writing for the Supreme Court in 
Conley v. Gibson, penned the famous words, that “[i]n appraising the 
legal sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule 
that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless 
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”1 For the next 50 
years, this language both defined and embodied the standard for pleading 
a complaint in the federal court system, under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.2 However, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, the 
Supreme Court, stating that Conley’s “no set of facts” language has been 
“questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough,” concluded that 
“this famous observation has earned its retirement.”3  
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. To Mom and Dad with love, everything that I am, I owe to you. Also, 
special thanks to Professor Joan Steinman for her edits and commentary on the 
rough drafts of my article. Her input was invaluable and deeply appreciated. 
1 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (emphasis added). 
2 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that Conley’s “no set 
of facts” language has been cited by federal courts over 10,000 times in different 
contexts). 
3 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007). 
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Writing for the Bell Atlantic majority, Justice Souter held that a 
well-pleaded complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient “to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”4 Yet nowhere in 
Rule 8(a)(2)5 is there any mention of “facts” or “factual allegations.”6 
Rather, the drafters of Rule 8 were careful to avoid any reference to 
“facts,” “evidence,” or “conclusions” in the Federal Rules, so as to 
avoid the confusion that abounds under the Field Code of 1848.7 To 
achieve this goal, the drafters intentionally substituted the phrase, 
“claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”8 in place of the 
code formulation, “facts constituting a cause of action.”9 The Conley 
decision embraced this relaxed standard of pleadings, which sought to 
keep litigants in the court system rather than force them out of it.10 
Under Conley, outright dismissal of a claim was only permitted when 
the judge had determined—after taking all the allegations in the 
complaint as true—that proceeding to discovery or beyond would be 
futile.11 The express disavowal of Conley’s “no set of facts” language 
                                                 
4 Id. at 1965. 
5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
7 Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1975-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In 1848, David 
Dudley Field created the New York Code, which required “[a] statement of facts 
constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, 
and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what 
is intended.” 1848 N. Y. Laws pp. 497, 521. The predecessor to modern notice 
pleading, the New York Code of 1848, while more accessible by the common 
litigant than the Hilary Rules of 1834, implemented a pleading spectrum that 
confounded many commentators. The spectrum moved from evidentiary facts, to 
ultimate facts, to conclusions of law, with the goal being to plead only the ultimate 
facts. However, the distinctions between these three groupings were not abundantly 
clear and often times were too subtle to provide any substantive guidance.  
8 Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 5 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 
(3d ed. 2004)) (emphasis added). 
9 Id. (emphasis added). 
10 Id. at 1976-77. 
11 Id. at 1977. 
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by the Supreme Court indicates a heightening of federal pleading 
standards, despite the Bell Atlantic majority’s unconvincing insistence 
that they remain unchanged.12  
In the wake of Bell Atlantic, the federal appellate courts have been 
put to the task of interpreting the Supreme Court’s opinion and 
applying this new standard of federal pleading to the cases before 
them. Part I of this Note reviews the relevant background required to 
discuss the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Bell Atlantic. This 
background includes Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 
12(b)(6), the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley, and the Seventh 
Circuit’s pre-Bell Atlantic Rule 12(b)(6) jurisprudence. Part II dissects 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell Atlantic and looks at the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent decision in Erickson v. Pardus.13 Part III discusses 
two Seventh Circuit cases—EEOC v. Concentra Health Services, 
Inc.14 and Airborne Video & Beepers, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC15—
that interpret the Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic. Part IV 
explores the way in which the district courts have applied Concentra 
and Airborne. This Note concludes with a recapitulation of what is 
required for a complaint to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss in the Seventh Circuit, as well as a brief discussion of the 
impact that Concentra, Airborne and the other recent Seventh Circuit 
decisions will have on practitioners in the Seventh Circuit. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Before discussing Bell Atlantic, it is necessary to understand 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6), as well as the 
history of the Supreme Court’s Rule 8(a) jurisprudence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Id. at 1973. 
13 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007). 
14 496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007). 
15 499 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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A.  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6) 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 lays out the general rules of 
pleading in the federal court system.16 Subsection (a) of Rule 8 
specifically describes what information a claim for relief (also referred 
to in this Note as the complaint) must contain: 
 
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief 
must contain: 
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 
court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction 
and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; 
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief; and 
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include 
relief in the alternative or different types of relief.17 
 
Court’s interpret Rule 8(a)(2) when determining the standard of 
pleading in the federal court system.18  
A defendant can test the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint by 
making a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.”19 If the complaint has not satisfied the 
requirements of Rule 8(a), this motion should be granted by the 
court.20 The key question is what information Rule 8(a)(2) requires to 
be stated in the complaint. Conley v. Gibson was one of the first cases 
to provide an answer to this question.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 
17 Id. 
18 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Bell Atlantic 127 S. Ct. at 
1964-1965. 
19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
20 Id. 
4
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B.  Conley v. Gibson 
 
In Conley, plaintiffs brought a class action suit under the Railway 
Labor Act alleging discrimination against them by their bargaining 
agents.21 The complaint alleged that the petitioners were employees of 
the Texas and New Orleans Railroad; that Local 28 of the Brotherhood 
was the designated bargaining agent for the petitioners under the 
Railway Labor Act; and that a contract existed between the Union and 
the Railroad which provided the employees in the bargaining unit 
certain protections against discharge and loss of seniority. It further 
alleged that in May of 1954, the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs 
held by the petitioners or other black railroad workers and that all of 
the petitioners were either discharged or demoted. The complaint 
further stated that the 45 jobs were not actually abolished, but instead 
filled by whites as the blacks were forced to leave; that despite pleas 
from the petitioners, the Union did nothing to protect them from the 
racially discriminatory discharges; and that the Union refused to give 
them protection comparable to that afforded to white employees. 
Ultimately, the petitioners alleged that the Union was acting according 
to a plan and that under the Railway Labor Act such discrimination 
violated petitioners’ rights to fair representation from their bargaining 
agent.22 Petitioners asked for a declaratory judgment, an injunction 
and damages.23 
The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on several 
grounds including that the complaint failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be given.24 The district court dismissed the case due 
to lack of jurisdiction, finding that the National Railroad Adjustment 
Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy, and the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.25 The Supreme Court of the United 
States granted certiorari and held that the dismissal for lack of 
                                                 
21 Conley, 355 U.S. at 42. 
22 Id. at 43 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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jurisdiction was error.26 The Supreme Court also decided the 
respondents’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, even though it had not been 
decided below because of the lower court’s ruling on the jurisdictional 
issue.27 The Court found it proper to rule on the respondent’s motion 
because both parties had already briefed the issue and the respondents 
urged the Court to uphold the decision below on grounds other than 
lack of jurisdiction if necessary.28 
Justice Black first set forth the above-quoted and oft-cited rule 
that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”29 In 
adjudicating the sufficiency of the petitioners’ complaint, the Court 
looked to the general principle that the Railway Labor Act prohibits 
discrimination in representation on the basis of race.30 Because the 
petitioners alleged in their complaint that the Union denied them 
protection on the basis of their race, the allegations, if proven, would 
demonstrate that the Union breached its statutory duty to fairly 
represent all of the employees of the bargaining unit.31 As such, 
petitioner’s complaint sufficiently stated a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.32 
The respondents argued that dismissal was proper because the 
petitioners’ complaint failed to set forth specific facts in support of its 
general allegations of discrimination.33 However, the Court stated 
emphatically that:  
 
                                                 
26 Id. at 44 
27 Id. at 45 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 45-46 
30 Id. at 46; see Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 
(1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 
(1949); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
31 Conley, 355 U.S. at 46. 
32 Id. at 48. 
33 Id. at 47. 
6
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[T]he Federal rules of Civil Procedure do not require a 
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his 
claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short plain 
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair 
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.34 
 
According to Justice Black, this loose standard of pleading—
referred to as “notice pleading”—was made possible by the 
opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures authorized 
by the Federal Rules.35 These devices, and not the pleadings, are 
aimed at more precisely establishing the basis of the plaintiff’s 
claims.36 
In dozens of cases over the next half century, the Supreme Court 
and the federal courts of appeals followed Justice Black’s reasoning 
from Conley and cited his “no set of facts” language as the standard 
for notice pleading required by Rule 8(a)(2).37 Although court’s38 and 
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 47-48 
36 Id. 
37 In Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1978, he provides 
the following string citation to illustrate his point that Conley’s “no set of facts” 
language has indeed been the federal pleading standard since the Court’s decision in 
Conley in 1957:  
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818, 122 S. Ct. 1899, 153 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002); 
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 654, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 143 L. Ed. 
2d 839 (1999); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811, 113 S. Ct. 
2891, 125 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1993); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598, 109 
S. Ct. 1378, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S. Ct. 
173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980) (per curiam); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New 
Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246, 100 S. Ct. 502, 62 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1980); Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976); Hospital Building 
Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 746, 96 S. Ct. 1848, 48 L. Ed. 2d 338 
(1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 
(1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972) 
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 
(1972) (per curiam); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 422, 89 S. Ct. 1843, 23 L. 
Ed. 2d 404 (1969) (plurality opinion); see also Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 
7
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470 U.S. 532, 554, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 587, 104 S. Ct. 
1989, 80 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 561, n. 1, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 52 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1977) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 55, 
n. 6, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
See, e.g., EB Invs., LLC v. Atlantis Development, Inc., 930 So. 2d 502, 507 (Ala. 
2005); Department of Health & Social Servs. v. Native Village of Curyung, 151 P. 
3d 388, 396 (Alaska 2006); Newman v. Maricopa Cty., 167 Ariz. 501, 503, 808 P.2d 
1253, 1255 (App. 1991); Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P. 3d 377, 385-
386 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Clawson v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, LLC, 906 A.2d 
308, 312 (D. C. 2006); Hillman Constr. Corp. v. Wainer, 636 So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla. 
App. 1994); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 266 Ga. 612, 613, 469 S. E. 2d 198, 199 (1996); 
Wright v. Home Depot U.S.A., 111 Haw. 401, 406, 142 P. 3d 265, 270 (2006); 
Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 257, 127 P. 3d 156, 160 (2005); Fink v. Bryant, 
2001-CC-0987, p. 4 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So. 2d 346, 349; Gagne v. Cianbro Corp., 
431 A.2d 1313, 1318-1319 (Me. 1981); Gasior v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, 446 
Mass. 645, 647, 846 N.E.2d 1133, 1135 (2006); Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher, 
926 So. 2d 890, 893 (Miss. 2006); Jones v. Montana Univ. System, 337 Mont. 1, 7, 
155 P. 3d 1247, ____ (2007); Johnston v. Neb. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 270 Neb. 987, 
989, 709 N.W.2d 321, 324 (2006); Blackjack Bonding v. Las Vegas Munic. Ct., 116 
Nev. 1213, 1217, 14 P. 3d 1275, 1278 (2000); Shepard v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 361 N. 
C. 137, 139, 638 S. E. 2d 197, 199 (2006); Rose v. United Equitable Ins. Co., 2001 
ND 154, P10, 632 N.W.2d 429, 434; State ex rel. Turner v. Houk, 112 Ohio St. 3d 
561, 562, 2007-Ohio-814, P5, 862 N.E.2d 104, 105 (per curiam); Moneypenney v. 
Dawson, 2006 OK 53, P2, 141 P. 3d 549, 551; Gagnon v. State, 570 A.2d 656, 659 
(R. I. 1990); Osloond v. Farrier, 2003 SD 28, P4, 659 N.W.2d 20, 22 (per curiam); 
Smith v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tenn. 1986); Association 
of Haystack Property Owners v. Sprague, 145 Vt. 443, 446, 494 A.2d 122, 124 
(1985); In re Coday, 156 Wn. 2d 485, 497, 130 P. 3d 809, 815 (2006) (en banc); 
Haines v. Hampshire Cty. Comm'n, 216 W. Va. 499, 502, 607 S. E. 2d 828, 831 
(2004); Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 512 (Wyo. 1987); see also Malpiede v. 
Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1082-1083 (Del. 2001) (permitting dismissal only "where 
the court determines with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could prevail on no 
set of facts that may be inferred from the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill. 2d 311, 318, 818 
N.E.2d 311, 317, 288 Ill. Dec. 623 (2004) (replacing "appears beyond doubt" in the 
Conley formulation with "is clearly apparent"); In re Young, 522 N.E.2d 386, 388 
(Ind. 1988) (per curiam) (replacing "appears beyond doubt" with "appears to a 
certainty"); Barkema v. Williams Pipeline Co., 666 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa 2003) 
(holding that a motion to dismiss should be sustained "only when there exists no 
conceivable set of facts entitling the non-moving party to relief"); Pioneer Village v. 
8
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scholars39 frequently questioned this standard over that period of time, 
the viability of Conley remained intact until Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.40 
 
C.  The Seventh Circuit’s Pre-Bell Atlantic Rule 12(b)(6) 
Jurisprudence 
 
In Doe v. Smith,41 the plaintiff, a 16-year-old girl, engaged in 
consensual sexual relations with the defendant.42 Unbeknownst to 
plaintiff, the defendant used a hidden camera to make a recording of 
the two in bed together.43 Plaintiff alleged that after their relationship 
ended the defendant circulated copies of the videotape via email, and 
                                                                                                                   
Bullitt Cty., 104 S. W. 3d 757, 759 (Ky. 2003) (holding that judgment on the 
pleadings should be granted "if it appears beyond doubt that the nonmoving party 
cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him/her to relief"); Corley v. Detroit 
Bd. of Ed., 470 Mich. 274, 277, 681 N.W.2d 342, 345 (2004) (per curiam) (holding 
that a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted only "'if no factual 
development could possibly justify recovery'"); Oberkramer v. Ellisville, 706 
S.W.2d 440, 441 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (omitting the words "beyond doubt" from the 
Conley formulation); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1990) (holding that a motion to dismiss is appropriate "only if it clearly appears that 
[the plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim"); NRC Mgmt. Servs. 
Corp. v. First Va. Bank - Southwest, 63 Va. Cir. 68, 70 (2003) ("The Virginia 
standard is identical [to the Conley formulation], though the Supreme Court of 
Virginia may not have used the same words to describe it").  
38 Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1969 (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 
1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989); O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 
1976); McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir. 
1988)). 
39 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1665, 1685 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 463-465 (1986), (cited in 
Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1969). 
40 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
41 429 F.3d 706, 707 (7th Cir. 2005). 
42 Id. 
43 Id.  
9
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that at least one of the recipients posted the recording on the internet.44 
Plaintiff filed suit under the federal wire-tapping statute,45 alleging that 
the video recording was an unauthorized interception, and that its 
disclosure was forbidden.46 The district court dismissed under Rule 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.47 
It ruled that plaintiff’s complaint was deficient because it failed to 
allege that the recording was an “interception” within the meaning of 
§2510(4).48 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded.49 
Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook agreed that the complaint 
did not allege that the defendant “intercepted” anything.50 However, he 
wrote:  
 
[P]leadings in federal court need not allege facts 
corresponding to each “element” of a statute . . . . Usually 
they need do no more than narrate a grievance simply and 
directly, so that the defendant knows what he has been 
accused of . . . . Complaints initiate the litigation but need 
not cover everything necessary for the plaintiff to win; 
factual details and legal arguments come later. A complaint 
suffices if any facts consistent with its allegations, and 
showing entitlement to prevail, could be established by 
affidavit or testimony at trial.51 
 
He determined that the plaintiff’s complaint satisfied this standard 
because “it is easy to tell what [the defendant] is complaining about.”52 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000). 
46 Smith, 429 F.3d at 707. 
47 Id. at 708. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 710. 
50 Id. at 708.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
10
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Judge Easterbrook cautioned that district court judges tempted to 
dismiss a complaint because it does not contain a specific allegation 
should recall that only those claims explicitly stated in Rule 9(b) are 
required to be pleaded with particularity.53 Because “interception” is 
not on Rule 9(b)’s short list, it was error by the district court to 
dismiss.54 
In Kolupa v. Roselle Park District,55 the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals followed the reasoning of the Smith court. Plaintiff, 
Christopher Kolupa, alleged that the defendant violated Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 196456 by firing him on account of his religious 
beliefs.57 The district judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted.58 On appeal, Judge 
Easterbrook affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case 
for proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion.59 
Judge Easterbrook began by explaining the applicable federal 
pleading standard.60 He wrote that, “Federal complaints plead claims 
rather than facts . . . It is enough to name the plaintiff and the 
defendant, state the nature of the grievance, and give a few tidbits 
(such as the date) that will let the defendant investigate. A full 
narrative is unnecessary.”61 In order to state a claim for religious 
discrimination, a plaintiff is only required to “recite that the employer 
has caused some concrete injury by holding the worker’s religion 
against him.”62  
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 438 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2006) overruled by EEOC v. Concentra Health 
Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007). 
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
57 Kolupa, 438 F.3d at 714. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 716. 
60 Id. at 714. 
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
11
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The district judge dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint because it 
failed to allege that the other employees were similarly situated with 
respect to him, or that the other employees were outside of the 
protected class.63 According to Judge Easterbrook, however, it was 
error on the part of the district court to require the plaintiff to plead 
facts that pertain to every aspect of a prima facie case for a Title VII 
violation.64 Citing the Smith decision, Judge Easterbrook reiterated 
“that complaints need not plead facts and need not narrate events that 
correspond to each aspect of the applicable legal rule. Any decision 
declaring ‘this complaint is deficient because it does not allege X’ is a 
candidate for summary reversal, unless X is on the list of Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 9(b).”65 He reversed the lower court’s decision with respect to the 
discriminatory discharge claim.66 
Plaintiff’s complaint also alleged that the Park District failed to 
accommodate his religious beliefs, failed to promote him, and 
retaliated against him when he tried to protect his rights.67 Judge 
Easterbrook affirmed the dismissal of these claims because there was 
no mention made of them in the plaintiff’s administrative charge.68 
 
II.  THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
 
A.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
 
In Bell Atlantic, plaintiffs William Twombly and Lawrence 
Marcus brought a class action suit on behalf of the subscribers of local 
telephone and/or high speed internet services against the incumbent 
local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) that comprise Bell Atlantic 
                                                 
63 Id. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 715; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) says: “In alleging fraud or 
mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be 
alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
66 Kolupa, 438 F.3d at 716. 
67 Id. at 715. 
68 Id. at 716. 
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Corporation.69 The complaint alleged violations of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, which proscribes “every contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or foreign nations.”70 The 
complaint alleged that the Bell Atlantic ILECs conspired to restrain 
trade (1) by engaging in parallel conduct in their respective service 
areas to inhibit the growth of competitive local exchange carriers 
(“CLECs”) and (2) by agreeing to refrain from competing against one 
another, as evidenced by their common failure to pursue attractive 
business opportunities in contiguous markets, and by a statement of 
one ILEC’s CEO that competing in another ILEC’s territory did not 
seem right.71 
The district court dismissed the complaint because it found that 
the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.72 It reasoned that mere allegations of parallel business 
conduct do not state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and 
that the plaintiffs are required to allege additional facts tending to 
exclude independent self-interested conduct as an explanation for the 
parallel action of the ILECs.73 On appeal, the Second Circuit, citing 
Conley, reversed the trial court’s ruling and held that plaintiffs’ 
complaint was sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because 
the ILECs failed to show that there is “no set of facts” that would 
permit the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the parallel conduct they 
alleged was the product of collusion rather than coincidence.74  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the 
proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through 
allegations of parallel conduct.75 In reversing the Second Circuit and 
reinstating the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the 
                                                 
69 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1962 (2007). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F.Supp.2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
73 Id. 
74 Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 119 (2d Cir. 2005). 
75 Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1963.  
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Court held that even though a complaint need not contain detailed 
factual allegations, “a plaintiff’s obligation to demonstrate the 
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action will not do.”76 “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 
right to relief above the speculative level,” and absent at least some 
factual allegations in the complaint, “it is hard to see how a claimant 
could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the 
nature of the claims, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”77 
The Court’s rationale for requiring such factual allegations in the 
complaint was rooted in the rising costs of litigation and of 
compliance with discovery, in particular.78 According to the Court, a 
complaint that contains no factual allegations does not give rise to a 
“reasonable expectation” that discovery will reveal any evidence of 
the conduct complained of and “‘this basic deficiency should . . . be 
exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by 
the parties and the court.’”79 The Court mentioned that the expense of 
antitrust discovery, the use of discovery by plaintiffs to extract 
nuisance value from suits, and the increasing caseload of the federal 
court system all weighed in favor of requiring a plaintiff to 
demonstrate the plausibility of his claims at the pleading stage.80 
Plaintiffs’ main argument against the “plausibility standard”81 was 
based on Justice Black’s “no set of facts” language from the Court’s 
decision in Conley.82 However, the Court says that Conley’s “no set of 
facts” language never was intended to be read literally or in isolation, 
and that such a narrow reading of those words led to the erroneous 
conclusion that “a wholly conclusory statement of claim would 
survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the 
                                                 
76 Id. at 1964-1965. 
77 Id. at 1965. 
78 Id. at 1965-1966. 
79 Id. at 1966. 
80 Id. at 1966-1967. 
81 Id. at 1968. 
82 Id. 
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Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 505
possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of 
undisclosed facts’ to support recovery.” 83 Rather, the Court stated that 
Conley stands for the proposition that “once a claim has been stated 
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent 
with the allegations in the complaint.”84 In dismissing the complaint, 
the Court reasserted that it was not applying a heightened pleading 
standard in the context of antitrust litigation, but instead was clarifying 
and enunciating an often misunderstood legal principle. 85  
According to the Bell Atlantic dissent, however, there is not, nor 
has there ever been, any confusion about the standard of notice 
pleading that has dominated the federal system for the last 50 years.86 
Justice Stevens—the author of the dissent— believes that two practical 
concerns are at the heart of the Court’s departure from “settled 
procedural law.”87 Namely, the extraordinary expense that antitrust 
litigation can impose on a defendant, and the risk that jurors may 
believe that evidence of parallel conduct is sufficient to find an 
agreement as opposed to similar decisions made while defendants act 
independently of one another.88  
In response to these legitimate concerns, Justice Stevens argued 
that careful case management, strict controls over the discovery 
process, close examination of the evidence at the summary judgment 
stage, and carefully crafted jury instructions offer a satisfactory 
solution.89 He did not believe that the Majority’s concerns provided a 
sufficient reason to dismiss an adequately pleaded complaint and to 
allow the defendants to avoid filing an answer in which they could 
deny, or perhaps admit, that they acted, or omitted to act, in concert.90 
                                                 
83 Id. at 1968-1969. 
84 Id. at 1969. 
85 Id. at 1973. 
86 Id. at 1978 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at 1975  
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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The dissent went on to describe the history of pleading rules 
throughout the Anglo-American experience, noting the stringency with 
which such rules were applied in the early 19th century and the 
relaxation of these standards as time passed.91 According to Justice 
Stevens, the goal of the relaxed pleading requirements of the Federal 
Rules “was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them 
in,” and Conley’s “no set of facts” language is consistent with that 
goal. Its “formulation permits outright dismissal only when proceeding 
to discovery or beyond would be futile.”92  
In further support of the dissenters’ belief that Rule 8(a)(2) does 
not require a plaintiff to plead any specific facts in the complaint, the 
dissent pointed to Rule 9’s imposition of a “particularity” requirement 
on all complaints that allege fraud or mistake.93 Given the canon of 
statutory construction expressio unius est exclusion alterius— “the 
expression of one is the exclusion of others”—it argued that Congress 
clearly did not intend plaintiffs who are not alleging fraud or mistake 
to have to plead with the kind of factual specificity required by the 
majority.94 
 
B.  Erickson v. Pardus 
 
Just two weeks after Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court handed 
down another opinion regarding Rules 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6) and the federal 
pleading standard.95 In Erickson, a prison inmate filed suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights by prison officials at the Limon Correctional Facility in 
Colorado.96 The petitioner, William Erickson, alleged that a liver 
condition that resulted from hepatitis C required a medical treatment 
                                                 
91 Id. at 1975-1976  
92 Id. at 1977  
93 Id. at 1977 n.4  
94 Id. 
95 The decision in Bell Atlantic was handed down on May 21, 2007. The Court 
decided Erickson on June 4. 
96 Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2197-98 (2007). 
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program that the officials had commenced but wrongfully terminated, 
consequently putting his life in danger.97 The district court dismissed 
petitioner’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, characterizing the complaint’s 
allegations as “conclusory.”98 The Supreme Court vacated the 
judgment from below and remanded the case for further review.99 
According to petitioner’s complaint, officials at the Colorado 
Department of Corrections (“Department”) diagnosed the petitioner 
with hepatitis C.100 Petitioner began treatment for the disease after 
completing the necessary courses and complying with Department 
procedures.101 The year-long treatment program required the use of a 
syringe for weekly self-injections of medication.102 However, after 
petitioner’s treatment began prison officials were unable to account for 
one of the syringes made available to him and the other prisoners 
receiving similar medical attention.103 Eventually, they found it in a 
communal trash can, modified in a manner which suggested illegal 
drug use.104  
The prison officials, disbelieving petitioner’s claim that he had not 
taken the syringe, cited him for violating the Colorado penal code’s 
provisions against possession of drug paraphernalia.105 Furthermore, 
petitioner was removed from his treatment program as a result of the 
officials’ assessment that he intended to use drugs.106 Petitioner 
alleged that “Dr. Bloor had ‘removed [him] from [his] hepatitis C 
treatment’ in violation of department protocol, ‘thus endangering [his] 
                                                 
97 Id. at 2197-98. 
98 Id. at 2198. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
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life.’”107 He requested relief including damages and an injunction 
requiring the Department to resume his treatment for hepatitis C.108 
Three months after filing his complaint, petitioner filed a Motion 
for expedited Review Due to Imminent Danger indicating it was 
undisputed that he had hepatitis C, that he met the Department’s 
standards for treatment of the disease, and that his liver was suffering 
irreversible harm due to lack of treatment.109 Respondents filed a 
motion to dismiss, and the Magistrate Judge before whom the motion 
was pending recommended that the District Court dismiss the 
complaint because petitioner failed to allege that Dr. Bloor’s actions 
caused him “substantial harm.”110 The District Court agreed with the 
Magistrate Judge and dismissed the complaint.111 The Court of 
Appeals affirmed, stating that petitioner had failed to “allege that as a 
result of the discontinuance of the treatment itself shortly after it began 
or the interruption of treatment for approximately eighteen months he 
suffered any harm, let alone substantial harm, [other] than what he 
already faced from Hepatitis C itself[.]”112 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a Per Curiam 
opinion, reversed the decision from below, holding that “[i]t was error 
for the Court of Appeals to conclude that petitioner’s allegations were 
too conclusory to establish for pleading purposes that petitioner had 
suffered ‘a cognizable independent harm’ as a result of his removal 
from the hepatitis C treatment program.”113 Quoting Justice Stevens’ 
opinion from Bell Atlantic, the Court stated that “Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ Specific facts are 
                                                 
107 Id. at 2199 (quoting Petitioner’s Complaint) (brackets in original). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (quoting the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation on Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 198 Fed. Appx. 694, 697 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
113 Id. at 2200 (quoting Erickson, 198 Fed. Appx. At 698). 
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not necessary; the statement need only “’give the defendant fair notice 
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”114 
Petitioner’s complaint stated that Dr. Bloor’s decision to remove 
him from his hepatitis C treatment constituted a danger to his life.115 It 
alleged that his medication was discontinued shortly after the 
treatment program began; that the prescribed treatment program was 
supposed to last a year; that he was still in need of treatment for his 
condition; and that prison officials refused to provide him with 
treatment.116 According to the Court, “[t]his alone was enough to 
satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).” In addition, petitioner strengthened his claim by 
making more specific allegations in documents attached to the 
complaint and in later filings.117 
The Court also pointed out that petitioner was proceeding pro se, 
and that documents filed pro se are “to be liberally construed.”118 This 
fact made the Court of Appeals’ departure from Rule 8(a)(2)’s liberal 
pleading standards even more evident, because “a pro se complaint, 
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards 
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”119 
The Court did not determine whether petitioner’s complaint was 
sufficient in all respects, because respondents’ raised multiple 
arguments in their motion to dismiss that were not decided by the 
district court.120 The Court did decide, however, that the complaint 
could not be dismissed on the ground that the allegations in the 
complaint were too conclusory.121 The Court vacated the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals, and remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with the Court’s opinion. 
                                                 
114 Id. at 2200 (quoting Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 
U.S. at 47)). 
115 Id. at 2200. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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III.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES INTERPRETING BELL ATLANTIC V. 
TWOMBLY 
 
Although the Seventh Circuit had already  cited Bell Atlantic in 
three separate decisions, it did not seriously dissect the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in that case until EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 
Inc. 122 In Concentra, the Seventh Circuit determined that the federal 
pleading standard laid out in Bell Atlantic requires a complaint not 
only to provide the defendant with fair notice of the claims against him 
and the grounds upon which they rest, but to also plausibly suggest 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.123 However, Bell Atlantic left 
largely unanswered what it means to “plausibly suggest that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.”  
Although the Supreme Court attempted to explain the newly 
imposed plausibility standard with declarations such as, “the ‘plain 
statement’ [must] possess enough heft to ‘show that the pleader is 
entitled to relief,’”124 and “[f]actual allegations must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above a speculative level,”125 such statements do 
not provide any substantive guidance as to how much, or what type of 
factual detail is ultimately required under the “plausibility standard.” 
The Seventh Circuit maintained in Airborne Video & Beepers, Inc. v. 
AT & T Mobility LLC that specific facts need not be pled in the 
complaint. 126 As a practical matter, however, it does not appear 
possible to satisfy either Bell Atlantic, or the Seventh Circuit’s 
                                                 
122 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued opinions in three cases that 
cited to or quoted Bell Atlantic before EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 
F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007). None of them, however, delved into the Supreme Court’s 
decision as deeply as the court in Concentra did. See In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, 
491 F.3d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 2007); Jennings v. Auto Meter Products, 495 F.3d 466, 
472 (7th Cir. 2007); Local 15, IBEW v. Exelon Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 
2007).  
123 Concentra, 496 F.3d at 776. 
124 Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 
125 Id. at 1965. 
126 Airborne, 499 F.3d at 667. 
20
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 511
interpretation of Bell Atlantic, without including some factual 
allegations in the complaint.  
 
A.  EEOC v. Concentra Health Services 
 
In EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., plaintiff Charles Horn 
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) when he was fired by his employer Concentra 
Health Services (“Concentra”).127 The EEOC brought suit against 
Concentra on behalf of Horn alleging retaliation, in violation of 42 
U.S.C. §20003-3(a).128 According to the complaint, Horn reported to 
Concentra’s director of human resources that “his female supervisor 
gave a male subordinate, with whom she was having an inappropriate 
sexual relationship, preferential treatment over similarly situated 
employees with respect to his employment,” and that Concentra 
responded by firing Horn.129 
The district court granted Concentra’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and 
dismissed the EEOC’s complaint.130 It held that Horn could not have 
believed that the activities he opposed violated Title VII because, at 
the time Horn reported the affair, favoring a subordinate because of a 
sexual relationship did not, without more, constitute a violation of 
Title VII.131 The court further held that even had Horn actually 
believed that the affair was a violation of Title VII, his belief was not 
reasonable, and thus the EEOC’s complaint did not state a claim.132 
The EEOC filed an amended complaint which, in the opinion of 
the district court, differed from the original only in that the paragraph 
setting forth the EEOC’s claim was far less detailed.133 It read as 
follows: 
                                                 
127 Concentra, 496 F.3d at 775 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 775-776. 
133 Id. at 776. 
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Since at least 2001, Defendant has engaged in unlawful 
employment practices at its Elk Grove location in violation 
of Section 704(a) of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Such 
unlawful employment practices include, but are not limited 
to, retaliating against Horn after he opposed conduct in the 
workplace that he objectively and reasonably believed in 
good faith violated Title VII by reporting the conduct to 
Concentra’s Director of Human Resources. Concentra’s 
retaliation includes, but is not limited to, issuing Horn 
unwarranted negative evaluations and terminating him.134 
 
Concentra again moved to dismiss and the district court again 
granted the motion, this time with prejudice.135 The court based its 
decision on its opinion that the complaint did not provide sufficient 
notice of the nature of the EEOC’s claim and that the complaint failed 
to specify the conduct that Horn believed to be in violation of Title 
VII.136 The EEOC subsequently appealed.137  
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on 
appeal. Writing for the majority, Judge Cudahy engaged in a 
discussion about the standard of pleading required in the federal court 
system in the aftermath of Bell Atlantic. 138 He began by stating that 
the Supreme Court has interpreted the language of Rule 8(a)(2) as 
“impos[ing] two easy-to-clear hurdles” on the pleader:139  
 
First, the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient 
detail to give the defendant “fair notice of what the claim is 
                                                 
134 Id.  
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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and the grounds upon which it rests.”140 Second, its 
allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a 
right to relief, raising that possibility above a “speculative 
level”; if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of 
court.141 
 
Concentra argued that the EEOC failed to meet either of the Bell 
Atlantic requirements.142  
Somewhat confusingly, Judge Cudahy began his ‘plausibility’ 
analysis by focusing on the EEOC’s initial complaint rather than the 
amended complaint.143 Careful consideration of the arguments 
advanced on appeal by Concentra, as well as consideration of an 
argument that Concentra chose not to advance in support of dismissal 
are necessary to understand the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning on the 
plausibility issue.  
Concentra’s first argument for affirming the lower court’s 
dismissal was that the EEOC “pleaded itself out of court by alleging 
that Horn reported his supervisor’s favoritism to a lover,” an argument 
that, according to Judge Cudahy, “reflects a fond nostalgia for the 
EEOC’s original complaint.”144 Judge Cudahy acknowledged that 
dismissal of the initial complaint was probably correct; however, he 
did note that the now “rejected ‘favoring a paramour’ theory [] did not 
logically foreclose the possibility that some other aspect of Horn’s 
report might have furnished a ground for relief.”145 In so doing, he 
pointed out that some of the Seventh Circuit’s past cases suggested 
that the EEOC’s initial complaint would have been able to withstand a 
                                                 
140 Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 
(2007)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))(emphasis added). 
141 Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 
(2007)(emphasis added). 
142 Id. at 776-777. 
143 Id. at 777. 
144 Id. at 777. 
145 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.146 Yet those cases all were based on 
Conley’s disavowed “no set of facts” language and no longer dictated 
the Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence with regard to the sufficiency of a 
complaint.147 Now, a complaint “must actually suggest that the 
plaintiff has a right to relief by providing allegations that ‘raise a right 
to relief above the speculative level.’”148 “[I]t is not enough for a 
complaint to avoid foreclosing possible bases for relief[.]”149 
The court also discussed the fact that Concentra did not argue that 
the allegations in the EEOC’s amended complaint “fail[ed] to 
plausibly suggest a right to relief.”150 Rather, Concentra attempted to 
rely on a “narrow exception” to Federal Rule 10(c) that would have 
incorporated Horn’s original charge to the EEOC into the amended 
complaint, thus condemning the amended complaint to the same fate 
as the original.151 Why take this back door approach to having the 
complaint dismissed, as opposed to attacking its face? According to 
Judge Cudahy: 
 
Bell Atlantic itself does not appear to suggest that the bare 
idea of an antitrust conspiracy among major telephone 
companies like the one alleged in that case is implausible; 
rather, it appears to hold that the plaintiffs pleaded 
themselves out of court with detailed “allegations of parallel 
conduct” that did not plausibly suggest such a conspiracy.152 
 
Similarly, it was Horn’s detailed allegations of the conduct giving 
rise to the Title VII violation that resulted in the dismissal of the 
                                                 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 
(2007))(emphasis in original). 
149 Id. (emphasis in original). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 778. 
152 Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1963, 1966) (emphasis in original). 
24
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 515
original complaint.153 The leaner allegations of the amended 
complaint, that Concentra retaliated against Horn for making a report 
protected by Title VII—although possibly deficient in providing the 
defendant with the notice required by Rule 8—is no less plausible than 
a prison doctor improperly withholding medication from a prisoner.154 
The court found that the EEOC did not plead itself out of court with its 
amended complaint and it moved on to the question of notice.155  
On the notice issue, Concentra argued that dismissal was proper 
because the complaint did not specify the conduct that the plaintiff 
reported to Concentra’s Human Resources Director.156 Here the court 
agreed.157 Judge Cudahy reasoned that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that there 
be some minimum level of factual detail in the complaint that is 
sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what . . . the claim is 
and the grounds upon which it rests.”158 The question for the court to 
resolve in close cases is how much factual detail is required before the 
defendant has been given fair notice.159  
Judge Cudahy explained that, although the Rules do not require 
highly detailed factual pleadings, they do not “promote vagueness or 
reward deliberate obfuscation” either.160 Rather: 
 
Encouraging a plaintiff to plead what few facts can be easily 
provided and will clearly be helpful serves to expedite 
resolution by quickly alerting the defendant to the basic, 
critical factual allegations (that is, by providing “fair notice” 
of the plaintiff’s claim) and, if appropriate, permitting a 
quick test of the legal sufficiency of those allegations.161 
                                                 
153 Id. at 775-776. 
154 Id. at 778 (referencing Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200). 
155 Id. at 778-779. 
156 Id. at 779. 
157 Id. at 782. 
158 Id. at 779. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 780. 
161 Id. 
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Simply put, a complaint should contain clearly important 
information that a plaintiff is easily able to provide.162 The Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and Judge Cudahy 
denied the EEOC’s request for leave to file a second amended 
complaint in order to conform to Bell Atlantic, expressing doubt that 
Bell Atlantic changed the applicable federal pleading standard.163 
 
B.  Airborne Video & Beepers, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC 
 
The Seventh Circuit refined its Rule 8 analysis in a case decided 
three weeks after Concentra. In Airborne Video & Beepers, Inc. v. AT 
& T Mobility LLC, 164 the Seventh Circuit tried to read the Supreme 
Court’s Bell Atlantic decision in harmony with Erickson v. Pardus.165 
In Airborne, an owner of a retail store specializing in cellular, pager 
and long-distance telephone services brought suit against a telephone 
company for, among other things, breach of contract, tortious 
interference with business relationships, and deceptive and fraudulent 
practices when the telephone company stopped paying the plaintiff 
commissions on service activations. 166 Due to the plaintiff’s repeated 
inability to properly file an adequate complaint, the district court 
denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a fourth amended 
complaint.167  
On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
ruling.168 In so doing Judge Wood further explored the Seventh 
Circuit’s pleading standards even though she acknowledged that this 
issue was not raised on appeal.169 In her opinion, Judge Wood recited 
Bell Atlantic’s language that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 
                                                 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 782. 
164 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007). 
165 Id. (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007)). 
166 Id. at 664. 
167 Id. at 666. 
168 Id. at 668. 
169 Id. at 667-668. 
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‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 
conclusions.”170 Yet, she found that the Erickson decision clearly 
indicated that Bell Atlantic did not represent a shift to fact-pleading in 
the federal system.171 According to Judge Wood, Erickson reaffirmed 
that Rule 8 does not require specific facts, but merely requires that the 
defendant be given “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.”172 Taking these two propositions 
together, Judge Wood wrote: 
 
[W]e understand the [Supreme] Court to be saying only that 
at some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so 
sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type of 
notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled under 
Rule 8.173 
 
As such, a plaintiff can present as little factual detail in the 
complaint as he wants, provided the complaint plausibly raises his 
right to relief above a speculative level, as well as puts the defendant 
on notice of the claims against him and the grounds upon which they 
rest.174 
                                                 
170 Id. at 667. 
171 Id.; Contrary to the federal pleading standards, Illinois is a fact pleading 
jurisdiction. In a fact-pleading jurisdiction, rather than merely provide the defendant 
with fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, Bell 
Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1964, a plaintiff “must allege facts sufficient to bring a claim 
within a legally recognized cause of action.” Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344 
(1997); see Weiss v. Waterhouse Secs., Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 439, 451 (Ill. 2004) (stating 
that “Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction”). 
172 Airborne, 499 F.3d at 667. 
173 Id. 
174 Concentra, 496 F.3d 773; Airborne, 499 F.3d 663; Killingsworth v. HSBC 
Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2007); See, e.g., Johnson v. Lappin, 
No. 07-1465, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3393 at *4 (7th Cir.Feb. 13, 2008); Vancrete v. 
Appelman, No. 07-3214, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2837 at *7 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2008); 
Lang v. TCF National Bank, 249 Fed. Appx. 464, 466 (7th Cir. 2007); Sellers v. 
Daniels, 242 Fed. Appx. 363, 364 (7th Cir. 2007); Estate of Sims v. County of 
Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 608 (7th 
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IV.  ATTEMPTING TO APPLY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT TEST 
 
The district courts within the Seventh Circuit have had several 
opportunities to decide cases involving Rule 12(b)(6) motions in the 
aftermath of the Court of Appeals’ decisions discussed above. The 
cases discussed below demonstrate how the district courts’ are 
applying the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Bell Atlantic. 
 
A.  Higgins v. Conopco, Inc. 
 
Michael Higgins, a commercial truck driver, was injured when his 
truck shifted while he was trying to secure it to a loading dock at the 
defendant’s facility.175 Plaintiff alleged that the mechanism by which 
he was supposed to hitch his truck to the dock was old, improperly 
maintained and, as a result, did not properly function, thus causing his 
injury.176 In his third amended complaint, Higgins brought negligence 
claims against Conopco and four other defendants—Unilever, 
Unilever Illinois, Seng and Overhead.177 Conopco, Unilever and 
Unilever Illinois filed a third-party complaint against Higgins’ 
employer, England.178  
Their complaint alleged that Conopco entered into an agreement 
with England that required England to provide Conopco with 
transportation services.179 The complaint further alleged that, at the 
time of the accident, Higgins was an employee of England, and that, in 
accordance with the transportation agreement, England agreed to carry 
liability insurance and indemnify Conopco for any harm arising out of 
services under that agreement.180 The third-party plaintiffs’ complaint 
                                                                                                                   
Cir. 2007); Bartley v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 258 Fed. Appx. 1, 3 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Jervis v. Mitcheff, 258 Fed. Appx. 3, 5 (7th Cir. 2007).  
175 Higgins v. Conopco, Inc., No. 06 C 7077, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5508 at 
*3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2008). 
176 Id. at *3-4. 
177 Id. at *4. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at *5. 
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contained a breach of contract claim and a contribution claim against 
England.181 England brought a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the third-
party plaintiffs’ claims.182 
In ruling on the motion, the district court set out the standard of 
pleading required to survive a Rule12(b)(6) motion in the Seventh 
Circuit.183 It said that “[a] plaintiff is required to include allegations in 
the complaint that ‘plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to 
relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level’ . . . ‘if they do 
not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court.’”184  
England argued that the Court should grant its motion to dismiss 
the breach of contract claim because the transportation agreement was 
not a valid contract; that the agreement never went into effect; and, 
alternatively, that if the agreement was valid and went into effect, the 
accident was not covered by the agreement.185 As such, the third-party 
plaintiffs’ contribution claim should be dismissed as well.186 In 
response, the Court stated that the purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
is to contest the validity of the claim, and not to assess whether the 
claim is meritorious.187 A complaint need only provide the defendant 
with sufficient notice of the claim being brought.188 Applying the 
Concentra standard, the court found that the third-party plaintiffs’ 
allegations concerning England’s breach of the transportation 
agreement provided “sufficient detail and are not based upon pure 
speculation or legal generalizations.”189 As such, the complaint 
                                                 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at *5-6. 
184 Id. at *6 (quoting Concentra, 496 F.3d at 776). 
185 Id. at *7. 
186 Id. at *17. 
187 Id. at *8. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 9. 
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satisfied Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirements of plausibility and notice.190 The 
district court denied England’s motion to dismiss.191  
 
B.  Safeco Ins., Co. v. Wheaton Bank and Trust, Co. 
 
In Safeco, the plaintiff, Safeco Insurance (“Safeco”), sued 
Wheaton Bank and Trust (“Wheaton”) for conversion, improper use of 
trust funds, and constructive trust.192 Safeco’s claims against Wheaton 
arose out if Safeco’s duties as a surety to Integrated Construction 
Technology Corporation (“ICTC”), a construction contractor that had 
a deposit account with Wheaton.193 ICTC borrowed over $4 million 
from Wheaton, and when a portion of the debt became due, Wheaton 
set off over $500,000 from ICTC’s deposits—unbeknownst to ICTC or 
Safeco—in order to satisfy the debt.194 Because of these set offs to 
ICTC’s account, there were insufficient funds with which to pay its 
creditors and suppliers.195 As such, Safeco became obligated as a 
surety to provide the funds for ICTC while the account was short.196 
Safeco contended that the set offs were improper and, as a result of the 
set offs, it had to pay more than $1.6 million in order to satisfy ICTC’s 
debts to its subcontractors.197 Wheaton made a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss Safeco’s complaint for failure to state a claim.198 
The court said that in order for a plaintiff to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, “[he] must plead sufficient facts to give 
fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests, and those, 
                                                 
190 Id. (citing Airborne, 499 F.3d.at 667). 
191 Id. at *18 (finding that because it was too early in the proceedings to assess 
the validity of the transportation agreement, England’s motion to dismiss the 
contribution claim had to be denied). 
192 Safeco Ins. Co. v. Wheaton Bank and Trust, No. 07 C 2397, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5513, 1-2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2008). 
193 Id. at *1. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at *4. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at *1. 
198 Id. at *5-6. 
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if true, must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, 
‘raising that right to relief above the speculative level.’”199  
Regarding the conversion claim, Wheaton argued that Safeco’s 
complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because it failed to 
adequately allege that Safeco had a right to the money it demanded; 
that its right was present and unconditional; and that the defendant 
wrongfully refused to return the money. 200 The court agreed.201  
Safeco claimed that as subrogee of the subcontractors it had a 
present and unconditional right to the money set off by Wheaton.202 
However, under Illinois law a bank takes title to the money deposited 
with it and subsequently becomes a debtor to the creditor depositor.203 
As such, when a trustee—such as ICTC—deposits trust funds into a 
bank account, only the trustee, and not the beneficiary—in this case 
Safeco, as subrogee of the subcontractors—has an immediate and 
unconditional right to possess the amount deposited.204 The 
beneficiaries of the trust may seek to recover their funds from the 
trustee, but they cannot recover their funds from the bank under a 
theory of conversion.205 The court reasoned that because of this 
principle, Safeco could not sue Wheaton for conversion based on the 
subcontractors’ equitable interest in the deposits.206 
The court also found that the conversion claim was deficient 
because Safeco did not allege that the bank knew, or should have 
known, that the set offs included trust funds.207 While a bank has a 
right to set off the accounts of its customers in order to satisfy their 
indebtedness, this right does not extend to situations in which the bank 
has notice, whether actual or constructive, that the accounts include 
                                                 
199 Id. at *5 (quoting in part Concentra, 496 F.3d at 776). 
200 Id. at *6. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at *7. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at *8-9. 
207 Id. at *9. 
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trust funds.208 Because the “[c]omplaint does not contain sufficient 
allegations to plausibly suggest that the bank knew or should have 
know that it was setting off trust assets[,]” the court dismissed the 
conversion claim without prejudice.209 In so doing it stated that Safeco 
may be able to correct the defects by amending the complaint to allege 
that Wheaton had knowledge that the set offs contained trust assets, 
and by pleading claims subrogated from ICTC, rather than from its 
subcontractors.210  
The court dismissed the mechanics lien claim, holding that the act 
does not create a right of action against a bank that sets off funds held 
by a contractor in trust for a subcontractor, and it dismissed the 
constructive trust claim for failure to allege knowledge on the part of 
Wheaton.211 Because Safeco’s complaint lacked plausibility, the court 
did not reach the question of notice. 
 
C.  Zamudio v. HSBC N.Am. Holdings, Inc. 
 
In 2005, plaintiff Robert Zamudio, a 55 year-old Mexican-
American, attempted to refinance the mortgage on his home at 
Beneficial, a subsidiary mortgage company of the defendant, 
HSBC.212  Zamudio alleged that a Beneficial loan officer told the him 
that if his home was appraised at more than $140,000 he would be able 
to refinance.213 Plaintiff’s home was subsequently appraised at 
$144,900, but his loan application was denied.214 When plaintiff 
contacted the loan office to ask why his application had been denied 
he was informed that the value of his home was insufficient.215 
                                                 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at *9, 14. 
210 Id. at *14. 
211 Id. at *15, 17-18. 
212 Zamudio v. HSBC N.Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 07 C 4315, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13952 at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008). 
213 Id. at *2. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
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Plaintiff alleged that this was not the real reason his loan was denied, 
but rather, the denial was a result of HSBC’s automated underwriting 
and credit scoring systems, which have a discriminatory impact on 
minority applicants, such as the plaintiff.216 He filed suit against 
HSBC alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)217 and the 
Equal Opportunity Credit Act (“ECOA”).218 The defendant made a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims. 
The district court said that in order to satisfy the requirements of 
Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must accomplish two things: 
 
“[T]he complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail 
to give the defendant ‘fair notice of what . . . the claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests . . . .’219 Second, its 
allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a 
right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative 
level’; if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of 
court.”220 
 
HSBC argued that because Zamudio failed to specifically identify 
any discriminatory policy or practice, that he failed to provide the 
defendants with fair notice of the claims against them.221 However, the 
court ruled that Zamudio’s assertion that “racially discriminatory 
assumptions are embedded in the statistical formulas used [by the 
defendants] to analyze credit information and ultimately form 
underwriting decisions” is sufficient to meet the pleading requirements 
imposed by Bell Atlantic.222 Furthermore, the complaint plausibly 
suggested a right to relief because the FHA and ECOA both make 
                                                 
216 Id. 
217 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3609 (2000). 
218 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000). 
219 Zamudio, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13952 at *3 (quoting Bell Atlantic, 127 S. 
Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). 
220 Id. (quoting Concentra, 496 F.3d at 779). 
221 Id. at *4. 
222 Id. 
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available to plaintiffs a claim for disparate-impact claim.223 The court 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.224  
 
D.  CardioNet, Inc. v. LifeWatch, Corp. 
 
LifeWatch and CardioNet are competitors that make heart 
monitoring devices.225 In January of 2007, LifeWatch launched a 
product called the LifeStar Ambulatory Cardiac Telemetry (“LifeStar 
ACT”), which was the subject of the litigation.226 Counter-plaintiff, 
LifeWatch, filed suit against CardioNet for a series statements made 
and actions taken by CardioNet with respect to the LifeStar ACT.227 
LifeWatch’s complaint alleged trade secret misappropriation,228 
intentional interference with expectation of business relationships, 
unfair competition, and three counts of fraud.229 The district court 
dismissed the fraud claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 
9(b),230 but denied the CardioNet’s motion to dismiss with respect to 
the other claims.231 
The district court began its analysis by setting forth the applicable 
federal pleading standard.232 In order to avoid dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6), “LifeWatch need only provide enough detail [in the 
complaint] to give CardioNet fair notice of its claims, show that the 
                                                 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at *6. 
225 CardioNet v. LifeWatch, No. 07 C 6625, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15941 at 
*3 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
226 Id.  
227 Id. at *3-5. 
228 CardioNet’s motion to dismiss do not challenge LifeWatch’s trade 
misappropriation claim. As such, the court did not assess the sufficiency of 
LifeWatch’s complaint with respect to that claim. 
229 Id. at *1-2. 
230 Fraud is one of the claims that must be pleaded with heightened specificity 
under Rule 9(b). A discussion of the court’s ruling with respect to the fraud claims 
contained in LifeWatch’s complaint is outside the scope of this Note. 
231 CardioNet, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15941 at *12. 
232 Id. at *2. 
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claims are plausible, rather than merely speculative, and that relief is 
warranted.”233 In order to state a claim for tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage, “LifeWatch must allege (1) the 
existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy; (2) 
knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the 
interferer; (3) an intentional and malicious interference inducing or 
causing a breach [or] termination of the relationship or expectancy; 
[and] (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship has been 
disrupted.”234 
LifeWatch’s complaint alleged that in June of 2007, without its 
knowledge, a physician improperly arranged to have a LifeStar ACT 
system delivered to the CEO of CardioNet.235 While in the CEO’s 
possession, CardioNet’s heads of research and product development 
dismantled, tampered with, tested and photographed the LifeStar ACT 
without informing LifeWatch that it had done so. LifeWatch alleged 
that CardioNet used the information it learned to further its marketing 
strategy, and that it: 
 
[M]isrepresented in advertisements and statements to 
physicians and governmental and private third party insurers 
that (1) [CardioNet’s] device was the only FDA approved 
and Medicare reimbursed arrhythmia detection and alarm 
system; (2) the LifeStar ACT device did not and could not 
meet the FDA’s requirements for approval of an arrhythmia 
detection and alarm system; and (3) its device was superior 
and/or safer than the LifeStar ACT.236 
 
LifeWatch argued that the statements made by CardioNet were 
false and misleading because they wrongfully suggested that the 
                                                 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at *9. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at *4. 
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LifeStar ACT was less safe and reliable than CardioNet’s device, and 
because the LifeStar ACT was and is FDA approved.237 
The court held that LifeWatch’s allegations that CardioNet 
knowingly issued false and misleading statements to the targeted 
consumers of the LifeStar Act device were sufficient to give notice to 
CardioNet of the intentional interference claim against it.238 The court 
also found LifeWatch sufficiently pleaded its unfair competition claim 
because the underlying allegations of a tortious interference claim 
sufficiently state a claim for unfair competition.239 
 
E.  Analysis 
 
As mentioned before, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell 
Atlantic provided very little substantive guidance to lower courts 
interpreting the “plausibility standard.” Understandably, it is a difficult 
task to provide a bright-line rule to determine to determine the 
sufficiency of a complaint without reverting to code pleading, or 
imposing fact-pleading on plaintiffs in federal court. It is thus 
reasonable to assume that the Court, by expressly disavowing Conley’s 
longstanding “no set of facts” language, intended for the circuit courts 
to experiment with new (and ostensibly more stringent) formulations 
of Rule 8(a)(2). 
Although the Seventh Circuit Court of appeals has explicitly 
adopted Bell Atlantic’s plausibility standard, it remains unclear, even 
after thorough examination of Concentra and Airborne, how a plaintiff 
satisfies the plausibility standard without going as far as fact-pleading. 
While Airborne makes clear that specific facts are not required to 
adequately plead a claim in the Seventh Circuit, it is equally clear that 
the pre-Bell Atlantic standard of pleading espoused in Smith and 
Kolupa is no longer viable. So what is necessary to satisfy the 
plausibility standard and to adequately plead a claim in the Seventh 
Circuit?  
                                                 
237 Id. at *4-5. 
238 Id. at *10-11. 
239 Id. at *11. 
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One common thread that ties together the district court cases 
described above is that the courts in those cases seem to require either 
direct (factual) or inferential allegations touching on all elements of a 
cause of action. For example, in Safeco, the court dismissed plaintiff’s 
conversion claim because the plaintiff’s complaint did not plausibly 
demonstrate that it was entitled to relief. In order to state a conversion 
claim, a plaintiff must establish that it (1) has a right to certain 
property; (2) that it has a present and unconditional right to immediate 
possession of the property; (3) that it made a demand for the return of 
the property; and (4) that the defendant wrongfully refused to return 
it.240 Plaintiff’s complaint, however, failed to adequately allege that it 
had a “present and unconditional right to immediate possession of the 
property.”241  
In CardioNet, the court denied cross-defendant’s motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, because the factual allegations in 
cross-plaintiff’s complaint touched on each element of the causes of 
action for intentional interference with expectation of business 
relationships and unfair competition.242  
Similarly, in Zamudio, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 
disparate-impact claims were denied because plaintiff’s allegations of 
discriminatory affect in defendant’s automated underwriting and credit 
scoring systems were sufficient to state a disparate-impact claim under 
both the FHA and ECOA.243 
The Higgins court explicitly stated that, “[u]nder current notice 
pleading standard in federal courts a plaintiff need not ‘plead facts 
that, if true, establish each element of a cause of action. . . .’” 244 This, 
however, is not contrary to the requirement that a plaintiff plead either 
direct or inferential allegations in order to state a claim. In Higgins, 
                                                 
240 Safeco Ins. Co. v. Wheaton Bank and Trust, No. 07 C 2397, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5513 at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2008). 
241 Id. 
242 CardioNet, 2008 U.S. Dist. 15941 at *10-11. 
243 Zamudio v. HSBC N.Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 07 C 4315, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13952 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2008). 
244 Higgins v. Conopco, Inc., No. 06 C 7077, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5508 at 
*6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2008). 
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third-party defendant argued that plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim 
should be dismissed because plaintiffs failed to allege the 
consideration that supported the transportation agreement, as well as 
the facts regarding the formation the agreement.245 The court denied 
defendant’s motion to dismiss and found that plaintiff’s breach of 
contract claim was adequately pleaded.246 Plaintiffs’ complaint 
contained a description of the alleged contract, as well as the date on 
which it was entered into. This information is detailed enough for a 
court to infer that a valid contract was formed. Whether the contract 
was supported by adequate consideration, and whether there was a 
valid offer and acceptance reach the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and do 
not address the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs’ complaint. Providing 
factual details concerning these points is outside the requirements of 
Rule 8(a)(2).  
A Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision handed down April 
2, 2008, lends support to the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint 
must contain at least inferential allegations respecting each element of 
a claim.247 In Glick v. Walker, plaintiff filed suit in the Southern 
District of Illinois against several prison officials at the Menard 
Correctional Center claiming that they were “deliberately indifferent” 
towards his mental health needs and the risks of harm posed to him by 
one cellmate’s smoking and another’s threat to kill him.248 The district 
court screened his complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a 
claim.249 A three judge panel, consisting of Judges Kanne, Rovner, and 
Sykes, assessed the Eighth Amendment claims of the plaintiff and 
vacated the judgment of the district court, remanding the case for 
further proceedings on all claims except plaintiff’s Americans with 
Disabilities Act250 claim.251 
                                                 
245 Id. at *10. 
246 Id. at *10-12. 
247 Walker v. Glick, No. 07-2929, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7716 at *1 (7th Cir. 
Apr. 2, 2008). 
248 Id.  
249 Id. 
250 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). 
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The unanimous court held that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 
claim regarding his exposure to second-hand smoke included enough 
detail to state a claim.252 Exposure to second-hand smoke can give rise 
to two Eighth Amendment claims: one for both present injury and 
future injury.253 According to the Court: 
 
To state a claim based on present injury, an inmate must 
allege that prison officials knew of and disregarded ‘serious 
existing health problems’ caused by the second-hand smoke. 
. . . To state a claim based on future injury, an inmate must 
allege that prison officials knew of and disregarded exposure 
to levels of second-hand smoke that ‘pose an unreasonable 
risk of serious damage to his future health.’254 
 
In the instant case, plaintiff alleged that he was diagnosed with 
emphysema; that he suffered increased chest pain due to his cellmate’s 
smoking; that defendants knew of his condition and his complaints; 
and, that defendants did nothing to remedy the situation.255 These 
allegations were sufficient to state a claim for both present and future 
injury under the Eighth Amendment.256 
The court also held that plaintiff’s complaint contained enough 
detail to state an Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials that 
failed to prevent his cellmate from harming him.257 “To state a claim 
for failure to prevent harm, the inmate must allege that prison officials 
knew of and disregarded a ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ and that 
harm did occur.”258 Plaintiff alleged that he gave a prison social 
                                                                                                                   
251 Walker, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7716 at *1. 
252 Id. at *7. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). 
255 Id. at *7-8. 
256 Id. at *8 
257 Id.  
258 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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worker two letters describing the threats made against him by his 
cellmate and detailing his concerns for his own safety.259 The 
complaint further alleged that the social worker told him that she had 
passed his letters along to internal affairs; that he never heard from 
internal affair; and, that his cellmate beat him badly enough to cause 
his head to bleed.260 As such, plaintiff’s complaint satisfied the 
serious-harm requirement.261 
The court goes on to address the plaintiff’s remaining claims in an 
almost identical manner, reversing and remanding plaintiff’s deliberate 
indifference and retaliation claims, but affirming dismissal of his 
Americans with Disabilities Act claim.262 It is apparent from the 
Walker court’s decision that the pleading standard set forth by Judge 
Easterbrook in Smith and Kolupa is long gone in the wake of Bell 
Atlantic. Whereas in Smith and Kolupa, Judge Easterbrook indicated 
that district judges would be reversed for requiring plaintiffs to 
provide allegations on specific points, the Walker court’s analysis 
promotes exactly what the pre-Bell Atlantic standard prohibited. The 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis in the Walker opinion supports the approach 
that lower courts should look to see if the factual allegations contained 
in the complaint either directly, or inferentially, touch on all the 
elements of the claim to be pleaded.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The importance of understanding the Seventh Circuit’s federal 
pleading standard should be apparent to practitioners. Although the 
new standard does not represent a shift to fact-pleading, the Seventh 
Circuit courts are clearly requiring attorneys to provide more 
information in the complaint. Per Bell Atlantic, the complaint must 
plausibly raise the plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level, 
as well as put the defendant on notice of the claims against him and 
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the grounds upon which they rest. In order to ensure satisfaction of 
these requirements, plaintiffs’ attorneys should, to the extent possible, 
provide factual or inferential allegations respecting all elements of the 
claims that they plead. Through the pleadings, a plaintiff should seek 
to convince the court that the allegations of the complaint, if taken as 
true, entitle the plaintiff to recovery. As Judge Cudahy suggests in 
Concentra, a plaintiff should plead all easily provided information that 
would serve to notify the defendant of the critical factual allegations 
against him.263 Until the Supreme Court weighs in on the matter again, 
practitioners in the Seventh Circuit would be wise to follow Judge 
Cudahy’s advice. 
                                                 
263 EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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